Scope and purpose
This note explores the go-around as a normal and legitimate operational outcome in airline operations.
It focuses on decision-making, timing, workload and mindset rather than on specific procedural criteria.
It does not replace company SOPs, stabilised approach policies or training material.
1. Operational context
In airline operations, the go-around is formally defined, trained and briefed.
Yet in practice, it is often perceived as an exception, a disruption, or even a failure.
Crews routinely operate in environments where:
- Time pressure is present (slots, curfews, rotations),
- Workload peaks during the approach phase,
- Expectations—explicit or implicit—exist regarding on-time performance and completion of the sector.
Within this context, the decision to go around is rarely purely technical.
It is influenced by timing, perception of margins, crew dynamics, and operational pressure.
2. The go-around is not a contingency — it is an outcome
From an operational standpoint, an approach has three possible outcomes:
- Landing,
- Go-around,
- Diversion.
None of these outcomes is inherently abnormal.
A go-around simply represents the moment when:
- The conditions required to continue the approach are not met,
- Or the crew judges that margins have eroded beyond what is acceptable at that moment.
Seen this way, the go-around is not a corrective action after a mistake.
It is the normal conclusion of an approach that should not be continued.
3. Why go-arounds tend to be delayed
Despite clear SOP criteria, go-arounds are often initiated late.
Common contributing factors include:
3.1 Plan continuation bias
- The aircraft is already configured,
- The runway is in sight,
- “We are almost there”.
Each additional second invested in the approach increases the psychological cost of discontinuing it.
3.2 Gradual erosion of margins
Rarely does an approach suddenly become unacceptable.
More often, margins erode progressively:
- Slightly unstable energy,
- Minor deviations,
- Increased workload,
- Degraded monitoring.
Individually, each element may appear manageable. Collectively, they increase risk.
3.3 Perceived operational pressure
- Slot constraints,
- Weather trends,
- Company culture,
- Previous successful “marginal” approaches.
Even without explicit pressure, crews may internalise expectations to “make it work”.
4. Decision timing: the critical element
In most events involving unstable approaches, the core issue is not whether the go-around criteria existed — but when the decision was taken.
Early go-arounds tend to be:
- Clean,
- Low workload,
- Clearly understood by both pilots.
Late go-arounds often occur:
- At high workload,
- Close to the ground,
- With reduced situational awareness,
- Under stress and surprise.
The same decision, taken earlier, is operationally trivial.
Taken late, it can become complex and destabilising.
5. Go-around as a workload management tool
A go-around should not be seen only as a response to failure.
It is also a tool to reset the situation.
A well-timed go-around:
- Restores time,
- Restores cognitive capacity,
- Allows the crew to rebrief, re-evaluate and re-align.
In that sense, the go-around is often the lowest workload option, not the highest — provided it is initiated early.
6. Crew dynamics and communication
6.1 Explicitly normalising the go-around
During the approach briefing, phrases such as:
- “A go-around is a normal option today,”
- “If either of us is uncomfortable, we go around without discussion,”
…help establish the go-around as an acceptable and expected outcome.
6.2 Avoiding ambiguity
Statements like:
- “Let’s see how it goes,”
- “We’re a bit high but it should be fine,”
…can mask deteriorating margins.
Clear, unambiguous calls reduce hesitation:
- “If not stable by the gate, we go around.”
- “If workload increases, we discontinue.”
7. Threats and error mechanisms
Common traps include:
- Normalisation of deviance: repeated exposure to marginal approaches without immediate consequences.
- Fixation: focusing on making the landing rather than reassessing whether landing remains appropriate.
- Diffusion of responsibility: each pilot expecting the other to call the go-around.
- Late authority gradient reversal: reluctance to challenge close to the ground.
Recognising these mechanisms in advance is often more effective than relying solely on criteria during the event.
8. Practical suggestions for line operations
- Treat the go-around as a planned outcome, not a last resort.
- Brief clear, early decision points.
- Encourage early verbalisation of discomfort, even if criteria are not yet formally exceeded.
- Remember that:
- A late landing is rarely criticized,
- A conservative go-around is rarely questioned,
- A forced continuation is often regretted only after the flight.